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Financial Services
The new face of regulation
On 28 October 1997, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) was launched 
with the publication of a paper outlining 
proposals to re-structure the financial 
regulatory system. It is proposed that the 
FSA will be a unitary regulator which will 
absorb the functions of the existing 
securities, insurance and banking 
regulatory organisations and bodies. The 
launch of this regulator constitutes a major 
development in UK securities regulation. 
The chairman of the new authority, 
Howard Davies, described the paper as:
'... merely a sketch oj the plan we have to 
implement the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
intention to reform
Nonetheless, the publication of the 
document gave the first real opportunity to 
examine the direction of reform in this
OBJECTIVES AND 
OBJECTIONS
Gordon Brown's speech announcing the 
re-structuring of the regulatory system 
explained that its objective was to 'prevent 
affairs such as Barings and BCCI ever 
happening again'. Since it seemed relatively 
clear that restructuring London regulation 
would not have had much, if any, effect on 
either of these collapses, this was felt to be 
an inadequate explanation. Consequently, 
in his speech announcing the launch,
by Simon Gleeson
Howard Davies took the opportunity to 
explain in a little more detail the objectives 
of the restructuring. He cited an external 
survey conducted by the Securities 
Institute which identified a lack of 
transparency and a perception that the city 
regulators had suffered from 'regulatory 
capture', by the interests which they were 
supposed to regulate as being the primary 
reasons for lack of confidence in the City. 
He went on to deal with some specific 
criticisms.
1. The criticism that the restructuring 
would lead to increased costs was 
accepted, but it was observed that 
there would be significant 
opportunities for improvements in 
operating efficiencies in the new 
svstem and for the allocation of fixed 
costs across a wider revenue base.
2. It is clear that the two year 
implementation period will lead to a 
regulatory stagnation. This was 
accepted, but once the decision to 
restructure had been taken this was 
inevitable. A more important criticism 
would be that the period was being 
unnecessarily prolonged, but it was 
said, quite possibly correctly, that it 
would be impossible to manage the 
introduction any more quickly than 
the current timetable provides.
3. Professor Michael Taylor, in his 'Twin 
Peaks' report, argues that prudential 
and conduct of business regulation 
should be effected by two separate 
organisations, on die basis that there is
o
a necessary conflict between these two 
types of regulation. Mr Davies rejected 
the existence of any such conflict 
except 'on a relatively limited' number 
of occasions. This seems right, as it has 
not been the experience of the existing 
regulators, which regulate both areas, 
that there is regular conflict between 
the two.
4. It is generally accepted that regulation 
of the wholesale and retail markets 
requires entirely different bases. This 
was fully accepted, but dealt with by 
observing that this form of differential 
regulation could be accomplished 
perfectly satisfactorily within a single
unitary financial services regulator, 
without having either to exclude the 
wholesale markets completely from 
the scope of regulation, or to render 
them subject to the entire slew of 
regulatory rules and policies.
5. The new regulator will be an extremely 
large organisation. This point was 
elegantly dealt with by observing that 
there is no necessary connection 
between size and efficiency.
THE TIMETABLE
The timetable for the introduction of 
the Financial Services Authority is largely 
unchanged from that given in the July 1997 
paper Reform of the Financial Regulatory 
System.
The most important point to make in 
respect of the timetable is that weasel 
words have crept into the text of the 
document with respect to its 
implementation. In particular, it is now 
said that 'early introduction of the 
[Financial Reform Bill] in Parliament miyht 
lead to enactment in 1999', and it seems 
clear that the new regulator is prepared at 
least to contemplate a delay in the 
implementation date for the new 
regulatory system. It appears most likely 
that this is a response to the feeling 
amongst the regulated that the timetable 
for the introduction of the new regulator 
provided for a time-period in which the 
industry could comment, but no time- 
period for the regulator to take any action 
in response to any comments received, and 
that this indicated that the consultation 
exercise was purely cosmetic. Admitting 
the possibility of the implementation of 
changes to the proposals in response to 
industry submissions has probably 
strengthened the hand of the new 
regulator.
REGULATORY SCOPE
Under the proposed financial regulatory 
reform bill, the Authority will, in broad 
terms, acquire the regulatory and 
registration functions currently exercised 
by the Self-Regulating Organisations, the 
DTI Insurance Directorate, the Building 
Societies Commission, the Friendly 
Societies Commission and the Registry of
27
28
Friendly Societies. There is only one 
surprise in the proposed scope of the 
regulators' activities. This is in respect of 
accountants, solicitors and others regulated 
by a professional body. The FSA only 
exempts professionals in respect of acts 
which are a 'necessary' part of their 
ordinary professional business. The 
extremely narrow interpretations of this 
exemption taken by the Law Society and 
the accountancy institutes means that most 
accountants and solicitors have maintained 
'precautionary' FSA authorisations on a 
'just in case' basis. It is proposed that the 
exemption embedded in the new act will 
be widened, and any professional firm 
which does investment business outside 
the terms of this wider exemption will be 
required to be authorised directly by the 
new regulator.
The effect of these changes will 
therefore be to deprive the Law Society 
and the various accountancy institutes of 
their regulatory authority. The primary 
impact of this change will be felt by the 
corporate finance practices of the large 
chartered accountancy firms who have put 
considerable resources into building up 
corporate finance teams.
NEW PROPOSALS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
Firm authorisation
It is intended that there is to be a 
consolidated authorisation procedure. This 
is in an effort to eliminate obstacles 
preventing firms already authorised to 
conduct one business entering another. 
During the transitional phase the new 
regulator says that it will take particular 
care to minimise the burden on firms 
wishing to expand their authorisations.
Individual registration
There will be arrangements made for 
the consolidation of individual registration 
across industry boundaries. The integrated 
approach to firm authorisation is to be 
based on a fundamental test that the 
applicant must be honest, solvent and 
competent, but in the context of individual 
registration it is clearly much more 
important to ensure that the individual has 
a level of skill and knowledge in the area in 
which he is to practice. Thus the 
consolidation of individual registration is to 
be left until some time after the 
implementation of the new Act.
Training and competence
The issue of promoting training and 
competence has been postponed for
consideration after the implementation 
date of the Act. It is clear that the new 
regulator is strongly in favour of 
programmes to ensure high levels of 
training and competence amongst 
employees of authorised bodies, but this is 
not a priority.
Supervision
Prudential supervision (that is, the 
regulation of capital adequacy) and 
conduct of business supervision (that is, 
regulation of trading practices) are to be 
combined within the supervision units. 
The training required to perform the two 
roles is somewhat different, but the effect 
of the combination will undoubtedly be to 
give any supervision team a better 
perspective as to the overall activity of die 
regulated company.
Unquestionably, the most interesting 
suggestion in the report is that concerning 
the organisation of the supervision of 
complex groups. It is suggested that this 
could be approached by means of a matrix 
structure, whereby individual 'centres of 
excellence' in particular disciplines within 
the new regulator could be called upon to 
assist in the regulation of complex groups 
by ad hoc teams. This structure would 
enable the concentration of resources 
within the regulator and enable the 
collection of a substantial bodv of 
knowledge which could uSen be drawn
o
upon by team leaders tasked with 
maintaining an overview of complex 
groups and dealing with supervision on a 
risk-related basis. In particular, in the 
sphere of value at risk pricing, a 
combination of the resources available to 
the various different regulators should 
result in a greater capability in the UK with 
respect to dealing with and approving such 
models that exist in any other financial 
centre. If correctly implemented, the result 
of this development might be substantially 
to increase the appeal of the UK as a home 
location for large financial services groups. 
The process of approving collective 
investment schemes for distribution to the 
public, currently undertaken by SIB, will 
continue to be undertaken directly by the 
new regulator.
Investigation, intervention and
discipline
The investigation and enforcement 
teams of the various different regulators 
will be pulled together into a single large 
entity which, it is hoped, will act in close 
co-operation with the criminal authorities. 
A common approach will be taken to 
investigating and dealing with all the
various potential breaches of the 
regulations policed by the new regulator 
including illegal deposit taking and 
unauthorised investment business.
Until the implementation of the new 
Act, investigations will continue to be 
carried out in accordance with the rule 
book of the governing entity  for example, 
an investigation commenced tomorrow 
into an FSA member will be conducted 
according to FSA rules. It is not clear
o
whether, if the investigation were to last 
until after the implementation date, the 
rules applicable to it would then change, 
but it must be hypothesised that they 
would not.
It is clear that the new regulator has 
asked for substantially increased powers in 
the new Act; although it is not clear what 
these powers are. However, it seems 
relatively clear that the request would not 
have been flagged in this document unless 
there were a fairly high probability that 
such powers would be granted. It is 
notable that the main request is for 
'enhanced powers for the civil disposal of 
cases of serious market misconduct'. This 
is a plea for the decriminalisation of the 
s. 47 offence of misleading the market and, 
by implication, of insider dealing. It is 
undeniable that the fact that these 
provisions are rendered criminal offences 
provides the regulators with an almost 
impossible obstacle to enforcement. The 
criminal standard of proof translates into a 
requirement to prove an intention to 
mislead or dishonesty beyond reasonable 
doubt. In practice, this has resulted in very 
fewr cases being brought, and those cases 
which are brought being regularly 
unsuccessful. It is undoubtedly right that 
the removal of these prohibitions from the 
criminal into the civil sphere would enable 
the regulator to prosecute them with 
considerably greater vigour and with a 
better chance of success. It is notable in 
this context that the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SLC), which has a 
much better record of success in 
challenging market manipulation and 
insider dealing, has no criminal sanction 
available to it in respect of either act. 
However, what is not clear is whether what 
is being sought here is a power to proceed 
in the ordinary civil courts, or a power to 
remove such issues into the regulator's 
private tribunal.
An issue which is still to be decided 
within the new system is the status of the 
cause of action which is at the moment 
embodied in s. 62 and 62A of the Financial 
Services Act. This creates a private right of
action for the benefit of a 'private investor' 
in respect of any rule made under the act; 
it is available to any private investor who 
suffers loss as a result of breach by a person 
authorised under the act.
The importance of this right of action is 
that the forthcoming and widespread 
replacement of the legal aid scheme with 
'no win, no fee' arrangements for litigation 
could reasonably be expected to produce a 
substantial increase in private securities 
litigation. At the moment s. 62 is extremely 
rarely used. It is not clear whether the 
financial services authority considers it 
desirable to retain and enhance the 
possibility of such 'self-help' by consumers, 
or whether it expects to absorb this right of 
action into its own jurisdiction.
Tribunals and appeals
The regulator has requested that a new- 
financial services appeal tribunal be created 
with power to hear appeals against the 
regulator's decisions as to the grant and 
revocation of authorisation and against the 
exercise of intervention and disciplinary 
powers. The question as to the regulatory 
disciplinary structure within the new- 
disposition is therefore left in doubt. It is 
clear that the existing system of private 
tribunals has resulted in a relatively low- 
cost system. However, it has had the 
corresponding disadvantage of preventing 
the development of a body of regulatory 
jurisprudence. It is occasionally suggested 
that the development of such a body of 
jurisprudence would do no more than to 
advantage the regulated at the expense of 
the regulator by circumscribing the 
regulator's powers. This argument cannot 
stand as no regulator deliberately demands 
the power to be capricious. Further, an 
enormous amount of time is spent re- 
arguing points in these tribunals which 
have already been argued in a very large 
number of previous hearings. The 
commonly cited remedy for this would be 
the abolition of the regulatory tribunals 
and the removal of these decisions into the 
ordinary civil courts. This would 
unquestionably create an enormous gain in 
transparency and perceived fairness, but at 
the cost of a substantially greater financial 
burden for all those concerned, both 
regulator and regulated. A properly 
conceived and public regulatory tribunal, 
whose decisions were published and 
binding as precedents, would go a very 
long way towards developing the detail of 
regulation which cannot adequately be 
dealt with by rules and pronouncements. 
The new regulator has in effect reserved its
position on this point.
Investor Compensation
Another of the more important 
initiatives in the new paper is the provision 
of a single integrated compensation 
scheme. The existing schemes will remain 
in place until the implementation date of 
the new Act, but after that date, the old 
schemes (including the policyholders' 
protection scheme and the deposit 
protection scheme) will be transferred to a 
single new scheme. The new regulator has 
undertaken to consult in greater detail 
about contributions and liabilities amongst 
the regulated in respect of this scheme with 
particular reference to issues arising out of 
potential cross subsidies.
Consumer education
The new regulator intends to take a lead 
role in the raising of levels of consumer 
knowledge as to financial products through 
campaigns of promotion, provision of 
information and by acting as facilitator to 
educational working collaboration with 
other bodies. Following the lead of the
o
SEC. the new regulator will also apply itself 
to the promotion of plain English in 
consumer documentation. This is, to some 
extent, a new role for a regulator, and a 
most welcome one.
Practitioner involvement
The new regulator wishes to have 
practitioners involved with its activities by 
recruitment, training and two-way 
secondment policies. There also appears to 
be a desire to emulate the internal 
arrangements of the SEC. It is widely 
accepted that the SEC gains a substantial 
increment in staff quality- through the fact 
that a period with the SEC is a recognised 
stepping stone to a number of careers in 
the financial services industry in the US, 
whether in banks, law firms or otherwise.
THE TRANSITIONAL 
MECHANISM
As envisaged in the earlier document, 
integration will proceed through a 
subcontracting mechanism. The new
o
regulator will take on the staff of the 
existing regulators as soon as possible. The 
existing regulators will remain in business 
as authorising bodies until N2 (the as yet
o N J
unspecified date when the functions of the 
regulatory bodies, other than the Bank of 
England, are transferred to the FSA) 
however, but they will 'exist' only as 
headquarters staffs, with the actual act of 
regulation subcontracted to the new 
regulator. It is unlikely that this will make 
any difference in terms of monitoring
enforcement at prosecution, since a self- 
regulatory body is only required to have 
access to sufficient resources in order to 
perform these tasks, and not to have these 
resources under his own hand (see para. 
1.3 of the SIB Standards of Regulation for Selj 
Regulating Organisations Guidance Note 3/95, 
and para. 4, sch. 2 to the Financial Services 
Act 1986). It is clearly highly arguable, on 
the basis of Schedule 2 and of the guidance 
notes, that there are some obligations 
which the self-regulating organisations 
(SROs) are not permitted to delegate. In 
particular, those relating to policymaking 
and the duties to ensure that particular 
tasks are performed in particular ways. As 
a matter of general administrative law it is 
not considered acceptable to delegate 
completely a statutory discretion, and a 
fruitful source of challenge to regulatory 
acts may well be being laid down here tor 
the interim period:
'Normally the courts are rigorous in requiring 
[a statutory] power to be exercised by the precise 
person or body stated in the statute, and in 
condemning as ultra vires action taken by 
agents, sub-committees or delegates, however 
expressly authorised by the authority endowed 
with the power' (Wade & Forsyth, 
Administrative Law (7th Ed.), at p. 348).
ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURE
Michael Foot, the former head of 
supervision at the Bank of England, takes 
over responsibility- for supervision and 
Philip Thorpe, the former head of IMRO, 
takes over responsibility for enforcement 
along with authorisation and consumer 
relations. Given the excellent reputation of 
the IMRO enforcement team his 
appointment seems eminently rational. 
Foot's appointment is equally appropriate. 
It seems clear that the activities of the 
group which he controls will be oriented 
primarily towards the development of 
more sophisticated and more informative 
monitoring and risk measurement 
techniques, a discipline in which the Bank 
was unquestionably the most advanced of 
the existing regulators.
Political control
The new regulator clearly expects to be 
subject to a great deal more political 
control than its predecessors. It envisages 
that the Treasury Select Committee will 
wish to take evidence regularly from it, and 
it will make an annual report to the 
Treasury which Ministers will lay before 
Parliament. It is likely that in practice this 
will enable the government of the day to 
intervene 'on the side of the consumer'. It 29
is an open question as to whether such a 
structure might have had any impact upon 
the conduct of the current pensions mis- 
selling difficulties.
International co-ordination
Contemporaneously with the launch of 
the new regulator a memorandum of 
understanding was announced between the 
SEC and the Commodities and Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) (which 
regulate the US securities and derivatives 
markets respectively) and the Bank of 
England and the new regulator. This is a 
very important development, since 
regulatory co-ordination between the US 
and UK regulators is of great importance 
to the industry and also suggests that SEC 
and CFTC have been to some extent
involved in the planning process for the 
new regulator, since it is unlikely that they 
would have agreed such a memorandum of 
understanding with an unknown body. It is 
important, and very welcome, that the 
process of reform in the UK should begin 
with a vote of confidence from the US.
BANK OF ENGLAND 
RESTRUCTURE
Simultaneously with the publication of the 
documents relating to the new regulator, the 
government published a Bank of England 
Bill, to implement the restructuring of the 
Bank of England. The Court of Directors of 
the Bank will continue in place; however, a 
statutory Monetary Policy Committee will be 
established which will be responsible for the 
design and implementation of the Bank's
monetary policy.
The Monetary Policy Committee is given 
statutory objectives. These are:
'To maintain price stability and, subject to that, 
to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's 
Government, including its objectives for growth and 
employment'.
This formulation, in particular the use of 
the words 'subject to that', appears to go a 
very long way towards giving the Bank an 
overriding statutory obligation to combat 
inflation, a requirement which is widely 
viewed as being at the core of central bank 
independence. ©
Simon Gleeson
International Trade Law
The GATT/WTO system and environmental standards
by Erasmo A Lara-Cabrera
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Only five years after the United Nations 
was established, a comprehensive text on 
the law of the UN had already been 
written, by Hans Kelsen. In his Preface on 
Interpretation Kelsen stated that:
'... [sjince the law is formulated in words 
and words have frequently more than one 
meaning, interpretation of the law, that is 
determination of its meaning, becomes 
necessary' (The Law of the United Nations, ed. G 
W Keeton & G Schwar/enberger, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd, London, 1951at p. (xiii))
and that:
'... it is considered to be the specific 
function of interpretation to find and establish 
the one, "true" meaning of a legal norm.'
However, he continued, 'there is almost 
always a possible interpretation different 
from that adopted by [a] law applying 
organ in a concrete case.' In this context, 
Kelsen concluded that 'law' as a 'means', is 
in reality subordinated to 'polities' as an 
'end' and, in that context:
'... the choice of interpretation as a law- 
making act is determined by political motives. It 
is not the logically 'true', it is the politically 
preferable meaning of the interpreted norm 
which becomes binding' (at p. xv).
In the context of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), this difference 
between juridical and political acts is not
as clear that which Kelsen suggests for the
oo
UN. However, it is believed that within 
the context of the WTO law-making and 
law-applying institutions, the decisions of 
the latter are to be 'guided' to a certain 
extent by the 'practice' determined by the 
former; although the latter do 
complement and can set 'precedents' for 
the actions of the former. This assertion 
can be illustrated by an exploration of the 
WTO constitutional structure
WTO CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE
Within the WTO both the 'political' 
and the 'judicial' bodies are constantly 
faced with interpretative tasks. Within the 
trade/environment discussion, the 
problems relating to interpretation are 
particularly significant, specifically with 
regards to the balance between the values 
and principles of both fields. In the 
GATT/WTO context, this discussion has 
been acquiring greater relevance. It is 
considered necessary that the WTO 
system take a more determined 
'environmental' approach. Following 
Kelsen's arguments, it is believed that for 
that to happen in a 'juridically certain' way, 
the WTO 'political' body will be the body 
which will need to adopt this approach as 
the 'end' to reach. It seems then that the 
adoption of waivers, interpretative
decisions, or treaty amendments (for 
details see art. IX and X of the A'larrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter WTO Charter)), 
by the WTO Members will be a possible 
answer. Nevertheless, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) - motivated by 
the panels and Appellate Body (AB)   may 
decide to reach the 'finishing line' in 
advance of this.
WTO POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL 
BODIES
In the spirit of establishing a functional 
distinction, the WTO 'political' body can be 
deemed to be the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council (however they act), while 
the WTO panels and Appellate Body can be 
considered as the WTO 'juridical' or 'judicial' 
body
WHO INTERPRETS EAW?
Within the constitutional structure of 
the WTO, there are different bodies 
whose functions relate to the task of 
interpreting the law. The Ministerial 
Conference (MC) and the General 
Council (GC) have wide powers of 
interpretation; the DSB a more restricted 
one. In relation to this, the WTO Charter
